In household finance markets, inactive households can implicitly cross-subsidize active households who promptly respond to financial incentives. We assess the magnitude and distribution of cross-subsidies in the mortgage market. To do so, we build a structural model of household mortgage refinancing and estimate it on rich administrative data covering the stock of outstanding mortgages in the UK. We estimate sizeable cross-subsidies that flow from relatively poorer households and those located in less-wealthy areas towards richer households and those located in wealthier areas. Our work highlights how the design of household finance markets can contribute to wealth inequality.

中文翻译：

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抵押贷款市场再融资交叉补贴


在家庭金融市场中，不活跃的家庭可以隐性地交叉补贴那些对财政激励措施做出迅速反应的活跃家庭。我们评估抵押贷款市场交叉补贴的规模和分布。为此，我们建立了家庭抵押贷款再融资的结构模型，并根据涵盖英国未偿抵押贷款存量的丰富管理数据对其进行了估算。我们估计，相当大的交叉补贴将从相对贫困的家庭和较不富裕地区的家庭流向较富裕的家庭和较富裕地区的家庭。我们的工作强调了家庭金融市场的设计如何导致财富不平等。