We exploit the extinction of the thrift supervisor (OTS) to analyze the effects of supervision on bank lending and bank management. We first show that the OTS replacement resulted in stricter supervision of former OTS banks. Next, we analyze the ensuing lending effects and show that former OTS banks on average increase small business lending by roughly 10 percent. This increase is concentrated in well-capitalized banks and especially in banks that changed management practices following the supervisory transition. These findings suggest that stricter supervision operates not only through the enforcement of loss recognition and capital adequacy, but can also act as a catalyst for operational changes that correct deficiencies in bank management and lending practices, which in turn increase lending.

中文翻译：

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监管者之死：严格监管、银行贷款和商业活动


我们利用储蓄监管机构（OTS）的消失来分析监管对银行贷款和银行管理的影响。我们首先表明 OTS 更换导致对前 OTS 银行的监管更加严格。接下来，我们分析了随之而来的贷款影响，结果表明，前 OTS 银行平均将小企业贷款增加了大约 10%。这种增长主要集中在资本充足的银行，尤其是在监管转型后改变管理实践的银行。这些发现表明，更严格的监管不仅可以通过执行损失确认和资本充足率来实施，还可以作为运营变革的催化剂，纠正银行管理和贷款实践中的缺陷，从而增加贷款。