Inspired by the pivotal role of supervision mechanisms in promoting and maintaining cooperative behavior in human society, we propose a mutual supervision mechanism to explore the evolution of cooperation on an interdependent network. The mechanism adjusts the game type of supervised nodes when their evaluation value falls below a critical threshold. Monte Carlo simulations reveal that the mutual supervision mechanism effectively encourages the emergence of cooperative strategies on interdependent networks. The experimental results show a direct positive linkage between the number of supervised nodes and the fraction of cooperation. In detail, the effect of the sucker's payoff on cooperation is more noticeable when most of the nodes are supervised by the mechanism. However, a higher sucker's payoff discourages cooperation when there are few supervised nodes. Furthermore, the stability of cooperation is closely related to a stricter supervision threshold. Conversely, if the supervision threshold is too lenient, previously stable cooperation levels will suddenly collapse.

中文翻译：

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评估和基于阈值的相互监督促进相互依存网络上的合作演进


受监督机制在促进和维持人类社会合作行为中的关键作用的启发，我们提出了一种相互监督机制，以探索相互依赖的网络上合作的演变。当受监督节点的评估值低于临界阈值时，该机制会调整受监督节点的博弈类型。蒙特卡洛模拟表明，相互监督机制有效地鼓励了相互依赖网络上合作策略的出现。实验结果表明，受监督节点的数量与合作比例之间存在直接的正相关关系。具体来说，当大多数节点都受到该机制的监督时，傻瓜的回报对合作的影响更加明显。然而，当受监督节点很少时，较高的傻瓜回报会阻碍合作。此外，合作的稳定性与更严格的监管门槛密切相关。反之，如果监管门槛太宽，原本稳定的合作水平就会突然崩溃。