The notion of subjective indistinguishability has long played a central role in explanations of the force of Cartesian sceptical hypotheses. I argue that sceptical hypotheses do not need to be subjectively indistinguishable to be compelling and I provide an alternative diagnosis of their force that explains why this is the case. My diagnosis focuses on the relation between one's experiences and third-personal accounts of the circumstances in which these experiences occur. This relation is characterized by a distinctive gap that leaves room for questions about the nature of one's circumstances, providing sceptical hypotheses with a foothold. I argue that this gap lends sceptical hypotheses their force and renders the stipulation of subjective indistinguishability unnecessary.

中文翻译：

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怀疑性假设和主观不可区分性


主观不可区分性的概念长期以来在解释笛卡尔怀疑假设的力量中发挥着核心作用。我认为，怀疑性假设不需要在主观上无法区分才能令人信服，并且我提供了对其力量的另一种诊断，以解释为什么会出现这种情况。我的诊断侧重于一个人的经历与这些经历发生的情况的第三人称叙述之间的关系。这种关系的特点是存在明显的差距，为质疑个人所处环境的性质留下了空间，为怀疑性假设提供了立足点。我认为，这一差距赋予了怀疑性假设力量，并使主观不可区分性的规定变得不必要。