Many jurisdictions confer a constitutional right to be protected against cruel and unusual punishments. This right is typically justified by three considerations. First, cruel and unusual punishments undermine human dignity. Second, such punishments shock the community’s conscience or violate evolving standards of decency. Third, grossly excessive sanctions violate proportionality constraints. This article advances an additional justification for the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Drawing on Kantian theories of public authority, republicanism, and fiduciary theories of legal authority, it argues that cruel and unusual punishments are objectionable because they constitute a form of legislative gross negligence that the Constitution prohibits. The core arguments of this article demonstrate why lawmakers have a fiduciary duty to ensure that the punishments they enact do not inflict needless harm and suffering—an obligation that requires them to enact sanctions that respect proportionality constraints. Lawmakers engage in legislative gross negligence when they enact cruel and unusual sanctions that are either indifferent to individuals’ interests to avoid unnecessary harm or depart significantly from the applicable standard of care. Ultimately, the right to be protected against cruel and unusual sanctions safeguards individuals against legislative gross negligence that results in grossly excessive punishments.

许多司法管辖区赋予宪法权利，使其免受残酷和不寻常的惩罚。这项权利通常由三个考虑因素证明是合理的。首先，残酷和不寻常的惩罚损害了人的尊严。其次，这种惩罚会震撼社会的良心或违反不断发展的正派标准。第三，严重过度制裁违反比例限制。本文为禁止残忍和非常刑罚提出了额外的理由。借鉴康德的公共权威理论、共和主义和法律权威的信托理论，它认为残酷和不寻常的惩罚是令人反感的，因为它们构成了宪法所禁止的立法重大过失的一种形式。本文的核心论点说明了为什么立法者有信托义务，以确保他们颁布的惩罚不会造成不必要的伤害和痛苦——这项义务要求他们颁布尊重比例约束的制裁。立法者在制定残酷和不寻常的制裁时就犯了立法重大过失，这些制裁要么漠视个人利益以避免不必要的伤害，要么严重偏离适用的谨慎标准。最终，受到保护免受残酷和不寻常制裁的权利可以保护个人免受立法重大过失的影响，从而导致严重过度的惩罚。