International Organizations (IOs), such as the United Nations (U.N.), engage in statebuilding in a range of post-conflict states. Statebuilding scholarship largely assumes that IOs, backed by their powerful member states, have at least temporary authority over the seemingly “weak” states in which they intervene. We argue, in contrast, that many post-conflict states shape IO statebuilding efforts through many statebuilding contracts, which we call incomplete arrangements, that give the post-conflict state the residual rights of control over the unnegotiated components of these statebuilding contracts with IOs. These incomplete arrangements, as opposed to complete takeovers, which are the other type of statebuilding contracts, provide procedural “weapons of the weak state” that enable the post-conflict state to influence what the IO mandate contains, where it intervenes, whom it hires, and when it exits. Using in-depth case studies of Burundi, Guatemala, and Timor-Leste, as well as analysis of 36 U.N. interventions in post-conflict states from 2000–2020, this article demonstrates the potential of incomplete arrangement statebuilding contracts to give post-conflict states institutional power over IO statebuilders, with important implications for scholarship on statebuilding and global governance.

联合国 (U.N) 等国际组织 (IO) 参与一系列冲突后国家的国家建设。国家建设学术在很大程度上假设国际组织在其强大成员国的支持下，至少对它们干预的看似“弱”的国家拥有暂时的权威。相比之下，我们认为，许多冲突后国家通过许多国家建设合同来塑造国际组织的国家建设努力，我们称之为不完全安排，这些合同赋予冲突后国家对这些与国际组织的国家建设合同中未经谈判的组成部分的剩余控制权。这些不完整的安排，与另一种类型的国家建设合同的完全接管相反，提供了程序上的“弱国武器”，使冲突后国家能够影响IO任务的内容、干预地点和雇用人员，以及当它退出时。本文通过对布隆迪、危地马拉和东帝汶的深入案例研究，以及对 2000 年至 2020 年联合国对冲突后国家的 36 次干预的分析，论证了不完全安排国家建设合同给冲突后国家带来的潜力机构对国际组织国家建设者的权力，对国家建设和全球治理的学术研究具有重要影响。