This paper investigates how signaling and herding behavior interact in crowdfunding markets to give raise to an information cascade, even when there are no identifiable experts, which is the typical case in reward-based crowdfunding. Using daily funding data for on all the projects launched on Kickstarter during one month, we find that during the initial phase of the campaign, the funding decisions of a reduced number of early backers are based on information and quality signals offered by the creator. However, during the second phase, signaling is substituted by the herding behavior of a large number of late backers, imitating early backers. The results suggest that, even in the absence of identifiable experts, backers self-select into early or late backers depending on their ability to process the information, so that herding after signaling generates an information cascade that ameliorates asymmetric information problems. The findings are relevant for (i) creators, that will obtain better results by targeting their crowdfunding campaigns at better informed potential contributors, and (ii) regulators, that can expect backers’ self-selection and herding to work together to protect uninformed backers from fraud and deception even when participation is not restricted.

本文研究了众筹市场中的信号传递和羊群行为如何相互作用，以引发信息级联，即使没有可识别的专家，这是基于奖励的众筹的典型案例。通过使用 Kickstarter 上一个月内启动的所有项目的每日融资数据，我们发现，在活动的初始阶段，数量减少的早期支持者的融资决策是基于创建者提供的信息和质量信号。然而，在第二阶段，信号传递被大量后期支持者模仿早期支持者的羊群行为所取代。结果表明，即使在没有可识别的专家的情况下，支持者也会根据他们处理信息的能力自行选择早期或晚期支持者，因此信号发出后的羊群效应会产生信息级联，从而改善信息不对称问题。研究结果与以下方面相关：(i) 创作者，通过将众筹活动瞄准更知情的潜在贡献者，可以获得更好的结果；(ii) 监管机构，可以期待支持者的自我选择和羊群效应，以保护不知情的支持者免受影响。即使参与不受限制，也存在欺诈和欺骗行为。