This essay argues for a relationist treatment of intentional identity sentences like (1): (1) Hob believes that a witch blighted Bob’s mare and Nob believes that she killed Cob’s sow. According to relationism, facts of the form a believes that ϕ and b believes that ψ are not in general reducible to facts of the form c believes that χ. I first argue that extant, non-relationist treatments of intentional identity are unsatisfactory, and then go on to motivate and explore a relationist alternative in some detail. I show that the general thesis of relationism can be directly motivated via cases already discussed in the literature, and then develop a particular version of relationism couched in the possible worlds framework. The resulting theory avoids the problems facing its non-relationist rivals, and yields a natural account of the truth conditions of (1), truth conditions which can be generated in a compositional manner by a version of dynamic semantics. The theory also helps us to cleanly separate semantic questions about intentional identity from metasemantic ones.

中文翻译：

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意向同一性的关系主义理论


本文主张对故意身份句子进行关系主义处理，例如（1）：（1）霍布认为女巫毁了鲍勃的母马，诺布认为她杀死了科布的母猪。根据关系主义，a 形式的事实相信 phi 和 b 相信 ψ 一般不能还原为 c 形式的事实相信 χ。我首先认为现有的、非关系主义对意向同一性的处理是不能令人满意的，然后继续在一些细节上激发和探索关系主义的替代方案。我表明，关系主义的一般论点可以通过文献中已经讨论过的案例直接激发，然后在可能世界框架中发展出关系主义的特定版本。由此产生的理论避免了其非关系主义对手所面临的问题，并产生了对（1）的真值条件的自然解释，真值条件可以通过动态语义的版本以组合方式生成。该理论还帮助我们将有关意向身份的语义问题与元语义问题清晰地分开。