Knowledge, like other things of value, can be faked. According to Hawley (2011), know-how is harder to fake than knowledge-that, given that merely apparent propositional knowledge is in general more resilient to our attempts at successful detection than are corresponding attempts to fake know-how. While Hawley's reasoning for a kind of detection resilience asymmetry between know-how and know-that looks initially plausible, it should ultimately be resisted. In showing why, we outline different ways in which know-how can be faked even when a given performance is successful, and in doing so, we distinguish how know-how can be faked (no less than know-that) via upstream and downstream indicators of its presence, and within each of these categories, we'll distinguish (in connection with detection resilience) both faking symptoms and (various kinds of) criteria. The unappreciated resilience of faked knowledge-how to successful detection highlights a largely overlooked dimension of social-epistemic risk––risk we face not just in our capacity as recipients of testimony, but in our capacity as both (would-be) apprentices and clients of knowledge-how.

中文翻译：

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 假知识-如何


知识和其他有价值的东西一样，可以被伪造。根据霍利（Hawley，2011）的说法，专有技术比知识更难伪造，因为与伪造专有技术的相应尝试相比，仅仅明显的命题知识通常对我们成功检测的尝试更有弹性。虽然霍利关于专有技术和专有技术之间的检测弹性不对称的推理最初看起来似乎有道理，但它最终应该受到抵制。在说明原因时，我们概述了即使给定的性能成功也可以伪造专有技术的不同方式，并且在此过程中，我们区分了如何通过上游和下游伪造专有技术（不少于知道）其存在的指标，并且在每个类别中，我们将区分（与检测弹性相关的）伪造症状和（各种）标准。伪造知识的复原力未被重视——如何成功检测，凸显了社会认知风险的一个在很大程度上被忽视的维度——我们不仅面临着作为证词接受者的风险，而且还面临着作为（未来的）学徒和客户的风险知识-如何。