A rich literature has discussed what it is to respond to a reason, e.g., to believe or act on the basis of some consideration or another. In comparison, what it would be to respond to a second‐order reason has been underexplored. Yet formulating an account of this is vital for maintaining the existence of second‐order reasons in both the practical and epistemic domains. And indeed, there are reasons to doubt this is possible. For example, responding to second‐order reasons is meant to be different from simply coming to believe or act for a more richly described first‐order reason but it's not clear what this would look like. This paper introduces an account of the second‐order basing relation which meets these concerns. It therefore both develops our picture of second‐order reasons and helps to defend their existence.

中文翻译：

---

应对二级原因


丰富的文献讨论了什么是对某个原因做出反应，例如，基于某种考虑或另一种考虑而相信或采取行动。相比之下，对二阶原因的反应还没有得到充分探索。然而，对此进行解释对于维持实践和认知领域中二阶原因的存在至关重要。事实上，有理由怀疑这是可能的。例如，对二阶原因的反应不同于简单地相信或采取更丰富描述的一阶原因的行动，但尚不清楚这会是什么样子。本文介绍了满足这些问题的二阶基关系的描述。因此，它既发展了我们对二阶原因的认识，又有助于捍卫它们的存在。