Using the case of Pakistan, this article explores the distribution and politics of public goods provision in urban slums. Across slums, we find that public goods are mainly provided to households located in central slums rather than those in the urban periphery. Within slums, we find politicians target spending towards wealthy households but do not go through brokers, unlike the more-studied case of India. Overall, the article shows how electoral incentives in Pakistan are biased against programmatic public goods provision for the urban poor. Our results then point to variation in patronage politics among slums in the Global South.

中文翻译：

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针对中心和（最不）贫困人口：来自巴基斯坦拉合尔市区的证据


本文以巴基斯坦为例，探讨了城市贫民窟公共产品供给的分配和政治。在贫民窟中，我们发现公共物品主要提供给位于贫民窟中心的家庭，而不是城市外围的家庭。在贫民窟内，我们发现政客们的目标是向富裕家庭支出，但不通过经纪人，这与印度的案例不同。总体而言，本文显示了巴基斯坦的选举激励措施如何偏向于为城市贫民提供计划性公共产品。然后，我们的结果表明南半球贫民窟之间的庇护政治存在差异。