Intentional action is often accompanied by knowledge of what one is doing—knowledge that appears non-observational and non-inferential. G.E.M. Anscombe defends the stronger claim that intentional action always comes with such knowledge. Among those who follow Anscombe, some have altered the features, content, or species of the knowledge claimed to necessarily accompany intentional action. In this paper, I argue that there is no knowledge condition on intentional action, no matter the assumed features, content, or species of the knowledge. Further, rather than follow the usual methodology in this debate of arguing by counterexample, I present an argument that explains why we continue to find counterexamples: intentional action and knowledge are regulated by thresholds under distinct pressures; in particular, the threshold of control regulating intentional action is disparately influenced by the role of intentional action in practical normativity.

中文翻译：

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分离行动和知识


有意识的行动通常伴随着对自己正在做的事情的了解——这些知识似乎是非观察性和非推理性的。宝石。安斯库姆捍卫了更强有力的主张，即有意识的行动总是伴随着这种知识。在那些追随安斯科姆的人中，有些人改变了声称必然伴随有意行为的知识的特征、内容或种类。在本文中，我认为，无论知识的假定特征、内容或种类如何，有意行为都不存在知识条件。此外，我没有遵循这场辩论中通常的反例论证方法，而是提出了一个论点来解释为什么我们不断寻找反例：有意的行动和知识在不同的压力下受到阈值的调节；特别是，规范有意行为的控制阈值受到有意行为在实际规范性中的作用的不同影响。