Intentional action is often accompanied by knowledge of what one is doing—knowledge that appears non-observational and non-inferential. G.E.M. Anscombe defends the stronger claim that intentional action always comes with such knowledge. Among those who follow Anscombe, some have altered the features, content, or species of the knowledge claimed to necessarily accompany intentional action. In this paper, I argue that there is no knowledge condition on intentional action, no matter the assumed features, content, or species of the knowledge. Further, rather than follow the usual methodology in this debate of arguing by counterexample, I present an argument that explains why we continue to find counterexamples: intentional action and knowledge are regulated by thresholds under distinct pressures; in particular, the threshold of control regulating intentional action is disparately influenced by the role of intentional action in practical normativity.

中文翻译：

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分离行动和知识


有意识的行动通常伴随着对一个人正在做什么的知识——这些知识看起来是非观察性的和非推理性的。G.E.M. Anscombe 为更有力的说法辩护，即有意识的行动总是伴随着这样的知识。在那些追随 Anscombe 的人中，有些人改变了声称必然伴随着有意识行为的知识的特征、内容或种类。在本文中，我认为有意识的行动没有知识条件，无论知识的假设特征、内容或种类如何。此外，在这场通过反例论证的辩论中，我没有遵循通常的方法，而是提出了一个论点来解释为什么我们继续寻找反例：有意识的行动和知识在不同的压力下受到阈值的调节;特别是，调节意向性行为的控制阈值受到意向性行为在实际规范性中的作用的不同影响。