This article helps understand why locations close to strategic infrastructure to transport illegal drugs (seaports, airports, highways, and US ports of entry along the Mexico-US border) or to increase income (pipelines) experience different levels of violence due to DTOs operations. Our theory breaks down the impact of the geographical distance to these facilities on violence into two effects. The first effect is produced by the level of (violent) competition among DTOs, measured by the number of DTOs employing violence. We report that greater proximity to the U.S. ports of entry along the Mexico-US border, ports, and airports furthers the number of competitors, and such increase boosts violence. The second effect shapes the intensity of competition among DTOs. Reductions in the costs of excluding competing DTOs from using the facility could trigger greater confrontation among DTOs. We confirm the importance of this second effect in relation to ports and the U.S. ports of entry along the Mexico-US border.

本文有助于理解为什么靠近战略基础设施以运输非法药物（美墨边境沿线的海港、机场、高速公路和美国入境口岸）或增加收入（管道）的地点会因 DTO 操作而遭受不同程度的暴力。我们的理论将到这些设施的地理距离对暴力的影响分为两种影响。第一个影响是由 DTO 之间的（暴力）竞争水平产生的，以使用暴力的 DTO 数量来衡量。我们报告说，美墨边境、港口和机场更靠近美国入境口岸，增加了竞争对手的数量，而这种增加加剧了暴力。第二个影响决定了 DTO 之间的竞争强度。降低将竞争性 DTO 排除在外使用该设施的成本可能会引发 DTO 之间更大的对抗。我们确认了第二个效应对美墨边境沿线的港口和美国入境口岸的重要性。