This article helps understand why locations close to strategic infrastructure to transport illegal drugs (seaports, airports, highways, and US ports of entry along the Mexico-US border) or to increase income (pipelines) experience different levels of violence due to DTOs operations. Our theory breaks down the impact of the geographical distance to these facilities on violence into two effects. The first effect is produced by the level of (violent) competition among DTOs, measured by the number of DTOs employing violence. We report that greater proximity to the U.S. ports of entry along the Mexico-US border, ports, and airports furthers the number of competitors, and such increase boosts violence. The second effect shapes the intensity of competition among DTOs. Reductions in the costs of excluding competing DTOs from using the facility could trigger greater confrontation among DTOs. We confirm the importance of this second effect in relation to ports and the U.S. ports of entry along the Mexico-US border.

中文翻译：

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贩毒组织的战略资源和暴力地理：来自墨西哥的证据


本文有助于理解为什么靠近运输非法毒品的战略基础设施（海港、机场、高速公路和墨西哥-美国边境的美国入境口岸）或增加收入（管道）的地点会因 DTO 的运营而遭受不同程度的暴力。我们的理论将这些设施的地理距离对暴力的影响分为两种影响。第一个影响是由 DTO 之间的（暴力）竞争水平产生的，以使用暴力的 DTO 数量来衡量。我们报告称，墨西哥-美国边境沿线的美国入境口岸、港口和机场越靠近，竞争者的数量就越多，而这种增加加剧了暴力行为。第二个效应决定了 DTO 之间的竞争强度。降低排除竞争性 DTO 使用该设施的成本可能会引发 DTO 之间更大的对抗。我们确认第二种影响对于墨西哥-美国边境沿线的港口和美国入境口岸的重要性。