How much of a loan should a lender retain, and how do loan sales affect loan performance? We address these questions in a model in which a lender originates loans that it can sell to investors. The lender reduces default risk through screening at origination and monitoring after origination, but is subject to moral hazard. The optimal lender-investor contract can be implemented by requiring the lender to initially retain a share of the loan that it gradually sells to investors, rationalizing loan sales after origination. The model generates novel predictions linking loan and lender characteristics to initial retention, sales dynamics, and loan performance. (JEL G21, G32)

中文翻译：

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贷款销售和贷款人激励的动态


贷方应保留多少贷款？贷款销售如何影响贷款绩效？我们通过一个模型来解决这些问题，在该模型中，贷款人发放贷款，然后将贷款出售给投资者。贷方通过发起时筛查和发起后监控来降低违约风险，但会面临道德风险。最优贷款人-投资者合同可以通过要求贷款人最初保留其逐渐出售给投资者的贷款份额来实现，从而在发放后合理化贷款销售。该模型生成新颖的预测，将贷款和贷方特征与初始保留、销售动态和贷款绩效联系起来。 （捷尔 G21、G32）