Although considerable attention has been separately given to factors such as power structures, price-dependent demand, and markup pricing schemes, there has been limited exploration of the combined effects of these factors on supply chain efficiency and the leader’s advantage. We propose a game theoretic model in which a manufacturer sells a single product to a newsvendor retailer who sets both optimal order quantity and selling price under uncertain price-dependent demand. Furthermore, we examine a supply network wherein a single retailer fulfills orders using a global manufacturer for regular orders and a local manufacturer to clear any shortages. Through numerical analysis, we show that the retailer always prefers to charge a percentage markup. In a two-player game, channel efficiency is higher when the retailer is the leader under linear demand; however, under iso-elastic demand, the manufacturer being a leader brings a higher channel efficiency. When a local manufacturer is involved as a second manufacturer, channel efficiency is higher when the retailer remains a follower, as this induces more fierce wholesale price competition between the two manufacturers. Additionally, when demand uncertainty is high in the two-player game with linear demand, the retailer as a follower can achieve higher profits, whilst high uncertainty under iso-elastic demand decreases both players’ profits. Moreover, it becomes advantageous for the retailer to have a local manufacturer as demand uncertainty increases, even when the local manufacturer announces the wholesale price first.

中文翻译：

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价格依赖的随机需求下权力结构和加价方案如何影响供应链渠道效率


尽管权力结构、价格依赖的需求和加成定价方案等因素分别得到了相当多的关注，但对这些因素对供应链效率和领导者优势的综合影响的探索却很有限。我们提出了一种博弈论模型，其中制造商将单一产品销售给报童零售商，后者在不确定的价格依赖需求下设定最佳订单数量和销售价格。此外，我们还研究了一个供应网络，其中单个零售商使用全球制造商来履行常规订单，并使用本地制造商来解决任何短缺问题。通过数值分析，我们表明零售商总是更愿意收取百分比加价。在两人博弈中，线性需求下，当零售商处于领先地位时，渠道效率更高；然而，在需求等弹性的情况下，制造商作为领导者会带来更高的渠道效率。当本地制造商作为第二制造商参与时，当零售商仍然是追随者时，渠道效率更高，因为这会导致两个制造商之间的批发价格竞争更加激烈。此外，当线性需求的两人博弈中需求不确定性较高时，零售商作为追随者可以获得更高的利润，而等弹性需求下的高度不确定性会降低双方的利润。此外，随着需求不确定性的增加，即使当地制造商首先宣布批发价，拥有当地制造商对零售商来说也变得有利。