In some cases we can only conform to norms like Choose the best! by luck, in a way that is not creditable to us. According to the perspectivist diagnosis, the problem with such norms is that they make reference to facts that may lie outside our perspectives. The first aim of this paper is to argue that the perspectivist diagnosis of the problem of luck is not ultimately correct. The correct diagnosis, I argue, is feasibilist: in some situations it is not feasible to choose, act, or believe in ways that conformity to objectivist norms robustly depends on. The same, I argue, is true of perspectivist norms: sometimes it is not feasible to track facts about our own perspectives. This shift in focus from the limits of our perspectives to limits on feasible ways of acting, choosing and believing has deep ramifications for normative theory. My second aim is to sketch an alternative, feasibilist way of thinking about a more subject‐directed kind of normativity that takes into account our limitations as human agents. The result is a normative picture that unifies the practical and theoretical domains.

中文翻译：

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观点和良好的性格


在某些情况下，我们只能遵循“选择最好的！”之类的规范。幸运的是，以一种对我们来说不值得信任的方式。根据透视主义的诊断，这些规范的问题在于它们引用了可能超出我们视角的事实。本文的第一个目的是论证对运气问题的透视主义诊断并不最终正确。我认为，正确的诊断是可行主义的：在某些情况下，以符合客观主义规范强烈依赖的方式来选择、行动或相信是不可行的。我认为，视角主义规范也是如此：有时追踪有关我们自己观点的事实是不可行的。这种焦点从我们观点的局限性转向对可行的行动、选择和信仰方式的限制对规范理论产生了深远的影响。我的第二个目标是勾勒出一种替代性的、可行的思考方式，思考一种更加以主体为导向的规范性，并考虑到我们作为人类主体的局限性。其结果是一个统一了实践和理论领域的规范图景。