In this paper, we present a set of preregistered studies inspired by both Lockean pluralism about individuation and discussions of conjoined twinning in the contemporary personal identity debate. In combination, these studies provide evidence of folk pluralism about individuation of “individuals like us” and also ways in which individuation judgments are integral to practical interests. First, our studies show that individuation judgments depend on a sortal supplied. Study participants tend to see two people or persons but only one organism in case of dicephalic twins, and they do not find these two verdicts inconsistent. Second, study participants tend to be pluralist in a sense that they find it acceptable to consider dicephalic twins to be—at the same time—two persons sharing one body and one two‐headed person. Third, while both perspectives are available, when reasons for counting are made salient, study participants tend to resolve pluralism in line with practical interests relevant in the context.

中文翻译：

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身份是什么？多元化、实际利益和个性化


在本文中，我们提出了一系列预先注册的研究，其灵感来自洛克关于个性化的多元论和当代个人身份辩论中连体双胞胎的讨论。综合起来，这些研究提供了关于“像我们这样的个人”个性化的民间多元化的证据，以及个性化判断与实际利益不可或缺的方式。首先，我们的研究表明，个性化判断取决于所提供的排序。在双头双胞胎的情况下，研究参与者倾向于看到两个人或两个人但只看到一个生物体，他们并不认为这两个结论不一致。其次，研究参与者往往是多元化的，因为他们认为双头双胞胎同时是共享一个身体的两个人和一个双头的人是可以接受的。第三，虽然两种观点都可用，但当计算的原因很明显时，研究参与者往往会根据与背景相关的实际利益来解决多元化问题。