By integrating Bernard Williams’ internalism about reasons with his later thought, this article casts fresh light on internalism and reveals what wider concerns it speaks to. To be consistent with Williams’ later work, I argue, internalism must align with his deference to the phenomenology of moral deliberation and with his critique of ‘moral self-indulgence’. Key to this alignment is the idea that deliberation can express the agent's motivations without referring to them; and that internalism is not a normative claim, but an example of sense-making from ‘the ethnographic stance’. This leaves a worry over whether moral conviction can coexist with an internalist understanding of reasons. Here too, however, Williams’ later thought provides an answer. Differentiating corrosive from corroborative sense-making, it elucidates how internalism, though not normative, can nonetheless affect our confidence in reason statements, thereby informing how we deliberate and how we address those whose motivations differ from our own.

中文翻译：

---

民族志立场下的内在主义：从自我放纵到自我表达和确证意义建构


通过将伯纳德·威廉姆斯关于原因的内在主义与他后来的思想相结合，本文为内在主义提供了新的视角，并揭示了它所涉及的更广泛的关注点。我认为，为了与威廉斯后来的作品保持一致，内在主义必须与他对道德深思熟虑现象学的尊重以及他对“道德自我放纵”的批判保持一致。这种一致性的关键在于，深思熟虑可以表达代理人的动机，而无需提及他们。内在主义不是一种规范性主张，而是从“民族志立场”出发进行意义建构的一个例子。这就让人担心道德信念能否与内在主义对理性的理解共存。然而，威廉姆斯后来的想法也在这里提供了答案。它区分了腐蚀性和确证性的意义建构，它阐明了内在主义虽然不是规范性的，但却如何影响我们对理性陈述的信心，从而告诉我们如何深思熟虑以及如何对待那些动机与我们不同的人。