Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) constitute crucial elements within intelligent transportation systems. However, the rapid development of VANETs has brought forth an increasing number of security concerns. Conditional Privacy-Preserving Certificateless Signature (CPP-CLS) has emerged as a promising solution to ensure data security, preserve vehicle anonymity, and establish unlinkability in VANETs. In contrast to traditional public key infrastructure systems that involve cumbersome certificate management, and identity-based frameworks fraught with key escrow issues, CPP-CLS presents a more apt approach for VANETs. Unfortunately, the researches on CPP-CLS present a strange phenomenon in that a scheme proposed is always pointed out to have various security problems, especially public key replacement attacks. Moreover, there is a scarcity of published researches on the generic construction of CPP-CLS. To tackle these challenges, this paper proposes the first generic construction for CPP-CLS based on Type-T (Three-move type) signature, in which the public key reconstruction technique enables any receiver who owns a part of the sender’s public key and the KGC’s public key to reconstruct the complete sender’s public key, which can alleviate the public key replacement attacks. A formal security analysis proves that our scheme effectively guards against existential forgery under adaptively chosen message attacks in the random oracle model, contingent upon the security of the underlying Type-T signature. Furthermore, We provide two specific instantiations of the generic construction to verify feasibility. Among them, the instantiation based on module learning with errors is effective against quantum attacks. Based on extensive experimental results and theoretical analysis, our implementations surpass the majority of existing similar schemes in either performance or security. This substantiates the feasibility of our generic scheme, making it applicable for constructing CPP-CLS schemes.

中文翻译：

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具有高效实例化的 VANET 条件隐私保护无证书签名的通用构建


车载自组织网络 (VANET) 构成智能交通系统中的关键要素。然而，VANET的快速发展也带来了越来越多的安全问题。有条件隐私保护的无证书签名 (CPP-CLS) 已成为一种有前途的解决方案，可确保数据安全、保持车辆匿名性并在 VANET 中建立不可链接性。与涉及繁琐的证书管理和充满密钥托管问题的基于身份的框架的传统公钥基础设施系统相比，CPP-CLS 为 VANET 提供了一种更合适的方法。不幸的是，CPP-CLS的研究呈现出一个奇怪的现象，即所提出的方案总是被指出存在各种安全问题，尤其是公钥替换攻击。此外，关于CPP-CLS的通用构建的已发表研究还很少。为了应对这些挑战，本文提出了第一个基于 Type-T（三步类型）签名的 CPP-CLS 通用构造，其中公钥重构技术使得任何拥有发送者公钥一部分的接收者都可以使用KGC的公钥重构了完整的发送者的公钥，可以缓解公钥替换攻击。正式的安全分析证明，我们的方案可以有效地防止随机预言模型中自适应选择消息攻击下的存在伪造，具体取决于底层 Type-T 签名的安全性。此外，我们提供了通用结构的两个具体实例来验证可行性。其中，基于带错误的模块学习的实例化对于对抗量子攻击是有效的。 基于广泛的实验结果和理论分析，我们的实现在性能或安全性方面超越了大多数现有的类似方案。这证实了我们的通用方案的可行性，使其适用于构建CPP-CLS方案。