Family-owned MNEs (FMNEs) face unique challenges for their newly established foreign subsidiaries due to the information asymmetry and divergent demands between the controlling families and external stakeholders. Despite the significant theoretical and managerial implications, there has been a notable research gap in understanding how FMNEs strategically disclose information to overcome these challenges. Drawing from literature on firms’ stakeholder management and responses to institutional pressure, we propose that FMNEs seek a compensating approach to reconcile various stakeholders’ divergent needs, mitigate information asymmetry, and enhance legitimacy. The compensating approach encompasses both the content and amount of information disclosed. Specifically, FMNEs selectively conceal information sensitive to socioemotional wealth (SEW) to protect the core interests of the controlling families. Simultaneously, they voluntarily disclose more information to signal professionalization to external stakeholders, alleviating concerns associated with higher family involvement. We further argue that transparency pressure in FMNEs’ home context amplifies their utilization of compensating information disclosure. Our arguments are generally supported by analyzing 850 newly established foreign subsidiaries from both FMNEs and non-FMNEs between 2010 and 2017.

由于信息不对称以及控股家族与外部利益相关者之间的需求不同，家族企业跨国公司（FMNE）对其新设立的海外子公司面临着独特的挑战。尽管具有重大的理论和管理意义，但在理解 FMNE 如何战略性地披露信息以克服这些挑战方面仍存在显着的研究差距。根据有关企业利益相关者管理和应对制度压力的文献，我们建议 FMNE 寻求一种补偿方法来协调各个利益相关者的不同需求，减轻信息不对称并增强合法性。补偿方法包括披露信息的内容和数量。具体来说，FMNE有选择地隐藏对社会情感财富（SEW）敏感的信息，以保护控制家族的核心利益。同时，他们自愿披露更多信息，向外部利益相关者传达专业化的信号，从而减轻与家庭参与程度较高相关的担忧。我们进一步认为，FMNE 本土环境中的透明度压力放大了它们对补偿性信息披露的利用。我们的论点得到了对 2010 年至 2017 年间 850 家 FMNE 和非 FMNE 新设立的外国子公司的分析的普遍支持。