Public agencies often use contractors to facilitate Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) discrimination complaint cases, but we know relatively little about which factors influence contracting performance of the complaint process. Drawing on contracting theories, this study examines two factors—incentive structure and contractor ownership (i.e., women-owned and small disadvantaged-owned)—that moderate the link between agency contracting use and agency performance in the discrimination complaint process. Using the agency-level panel data from multiple sources, this study finds agency contracting use facilitates the discrimination complaint process when agencies use a performance-based incentive structure. When it comes to the moderating effect of contractor ownership focused on the socially/economically underrepresented, the findings show that using small disadvantaged-owned contractors positively moderates the relationship between contracting use and performance at the agency level.

中文翻译：

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迟到的正义就是剥夺正义：管理平等就业机会歧视投诉的合同绩效


公共机构经常利用承包商来促进平等就业机会（EEO）歧视投诉案件，但我们对哪些因素影响投诉流程的承包绩效知之甚少。本研究借鉴承包理论，考察了两个因素——激励结构和承包商所有权（即女性拥有和小型弱势拥有）——这两个因素调节了歧视投诉过程中机构承包使用与机构绩效之间的联系。使用来自多个来源的机构级面板数据，本研究发现，当机构使用基于绩效的激励结构时，机构合同的使用促进了歧视投诉流程。当谈到承包商所有权对社会/经济代表性不足的人的调节作用时，研究结果表明，使用小型弱势承包商可以积极调节机构层面的合同使用和绩效之间的关系。