We study the run on the German banking system in 1931 to understand whether depositors anticipate which banks will fail in a major financial crisis. We find that deposits decline by around 20% during the run. There is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale deposits from both failing and surviving banks. In contrast, we find that interbank deposits almost exclusively decline for failing banks. Our evidence suggests that banks are better informed about which fellow banks will fail. In turn, banks being informed allows the interbank market to continue providing liquidity even during times of severe financial distress. (JEL G01, G21, N20, N24)

中文翻译：

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谁能知道哪些银行会倒闭？

我们研究 1931 年德国银行系统的挤兑情况，以了解储户是否预期哪些银行会在重大金融危机中倒闭。我们发现存款在运行期间下降了约 20%。倒闭银行和幸存银行的零售和非金融批发存款流出量相等。相比之下，我们发现，银行间存款几乎全部因破产银行而下降。我们的证据表明，银行更了解哪些银行将倒闭。反过来，即使在严重的金融危机时期，银行获知信息也使得银行间市场能够继续提供流动性。 (JEL G01、G21、N20、N24)