According to many philosophers, belief is a settling state. On this view, someone who believes p is disposed to take p for granted in practical and theoretical reasoning. This paper presents a simple objection to this settling conception of belief: it conflicts with our ordinary patterns of belief ascription. I show that ascriptions of unsettled beliefs are commonplace, and that they pose problems for all of the most promising ways of developing the settling conception. I proceed to explore the implications of my argument for the relation between belief and credence, and for the relative importance of belief in psychological explanation.

中文翻译：

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未定的信念

根据许多哲学家的说法，信仰是一种安定状态。根据这种观点，相信 p 的人倾向于在实践和理论推理中认为 p 是理所当然的。本文对这种固定的信仰概念提出了一个简单的反对意见：它与我们通常的信仰归属模式相冲突。我表明，对未解决的信念进行归因是很常见的，并且它们给所有最有希望的发展解决概念的方法带来了问题。我继续探索我的论点对信念和信任之间关系的影响，以及信念在心理学解释中的相对重要性。