Schopenhauer repeatedly claims that suicide is both foolish and futile. But while many commentators express sympathy for his charge of foolishness, most regard his charge of futility as indefensible even within his own system. In this paper, I offer a defence of Schopenhauer’s futility charge, based on metaphysical and psychological considerations. On the metaphysical front, Schopenhauer’s view implies that psychological connections extend beyond the death of an individual. Drawing on Parfit’s discussion of personal identity, I argue that those connections have personal significance, such that suicide does not allow one, as Hamlet hopes, simply ‘not to be’. On the psychological front, I argue that a distinction between agents’ intentions and underlying desires makes room for Schopenhauer’s claim that paradigmatic suicidal agents ultimately desire the opposite of what suicide accomplishes. I conclude by showing how this understanding of futility can buttress Schopenhauer’s charge of foolishness. My interpretation still leaves Schopenhauer vulnerable to certain objections, but shows that his account is more defensible than previous commentators have realized.

中文翻译：

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叔本华论自杀的徒劳性

叔本华一再声称自杀既愚蠢又徒劳。然而，尽管许多评论家对他的愚蠢指控表示同情，但大多数人认为，即使在他自己的体系内，他对徒劳的指控也是站不住脚的。在本文中，我基于形而上学和心理学的考虑，对叔本华的徒劳指控进行了辩护。在形而上学方面，叔本华的观点暗示心理联系超越了个体的死亡。借鉴帕菲特对个人身份的讨论，我认为这些联系具有个人意义，因此自杀不允​​许一个人像哈姆雷特所希望的那样简单地“不存在”。在心理学方面，我认为，行为者的意图和潜在欲望之间的区别为叔本华的主张提供了空间，即典型的自杀行为者最终渴望与自杀所实现的相反的结果。最后，我将展示这种对无用性的理解如何支持叔本华对愚蠢的指控。我的解释仍然让叔本华容易受到某些反对意见，但表明他的说法比以前的评论家意识到的更有道理。