Philosophical orthodoxy has it that intentional action consists in one's intention appropriately causing a motion of one's body, placing the latter (conceptually and/or metaphysically) prior to the former. Here, I argue that this standard schema should be reversed: acting intentionally is at least conceptually prior to intending. The argument is modelled on a Williamsonian argument for the priority of knowledge developed by Jenifer Nagel. She argues that children acquire the concept KNOWS before they acquire BELIEVES, building on this alleged developmental priority of knowledge to establish its conceptual priority. I start by taking a closer look at Nagel's argument, canvassing extant objections todo both with the empirical adequacy of her claims and their philosophical implications. Doing so allows me, in the second part of the paper, to draw lessons that inform the construction of a revamped parallel argument for the priority of ACTS INTENTIONALLY.

中文翻译：

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有意行动的优先顺序：从发展优先到概念优先

正统哲学认为，意向行动在于一个人的意图适当地引起一个人的身体运动，将后者（在概念上和/或形而上学上）置于前者之前。在这里，我认为这个标准模式应该颠倒过来：有意识地行动至少在概念上先于意图。该论点以詹妮弗·内格尔提出的威廉姆森知识优先论为蓝本。她认为，孩子们在获得“相信”之前就获得了“知道”的概念，基于这种所谓的知识发展优先性来建立其概念优先性。我首先仔细研究内格尔的论点，探讨现有的反对意见，以了解她的主张的经验充分性及其哲学含义。这样做可以让我在本文的第二部分中吸取教训，为构建关于故意行为优先权的改进的并行论证提供信息。