This article theoretically clarifies and presents the first large-N empirical support for a centuries-old intuition: that democracies are slow to use violent military force. It argues that democratic and nondemocratic state leaders managing interstate crises experience trade-offs over when to respond, and that democratic institutions incentivize democrats that consider violent military force to delay. The article presents a simplified account of leader choice during crisis and highlights two mechanisms rooted in external and internal politics that may drive delay. Analyses of nearly 950 states experiencing crisis provide support for expectations. Democracy is associated with a roughly 40% lower likelihood of responding to a crisis at any given point in time, conditional on responding with violence. Two illustrative case studies probe the plausibility of the proposed mechanisms. Taken together, the theory and findings illuminate the processes leaders engage as they consider abandoning negotiating tables at home and abroad in favor of the battlefield.

中文翻译：

---

民主的耐心

本文从理论上澄清并提出了对一个已有数百年历史的直觉的第一个大N实证支持：民主国家在使用暴力军事力量方面进展缓慢。它认为，管理国家间危机的民主和非民主国家领导人在何时应对方面需要权衡，而民主制度会激励那些认为使用暴力军事力量的民主人士推迟行动。本文对危机期间的领导人选择进行了简化说明，并强调了植根于外部和内部政治、可能导致延误的两种机制。对近 950 个经历危机的州的分析为预期提供了支持。民主与在任何特定时间点以暴力应对为条件的危机应对可能性降低约 40% 相关。两个说明性案例研究探讨了所提出机制的合理性。总而言之，这些理论和研究结果阐明了领导人在考虑放弃国内外谈判桌而转向战场时所采取的流程。