This paper develops theory to explore when it is most efficient for entrepreneurs operating under Knightian uncertainty to contract with human capital resource providers through market governance as independent contractors or through firm governance as employees or holders of residual rights of control (i.e., co-ownership stakes in the entrepreneurial firm). We identify and develop the notion of unintentional adverse skill selection which can occur if skill requirements change as entrepreneurs experiment with the production of new resource combinations of uncertain future value. We explore the comparative efficiency of the cooperative flexibility of firm governance and the autonomous flexibility of market governance when unintentional adverse skill selection is salient. We develop a typology of human capital resources based on the breadth and depth of the skills they possess. We propose that skill breadth is positively associated with the expected efficiency of firm governance and that skill depth is positively associated with the expected efficiency of market governance. We then utilize this typology to theorize about which governance mechanisms are most efficient for transacting with four types of human capital resources: polymaths (high skill breadth, high skill depth), novices (low skill breadth, low skill depth), specialists (low skill breadth, high skill depth), and Jacks/Jills-of-all-trades (high skill breadth, low skill depth).

本文发展了理论，探讨在奈特不确定性下运营的企业家何时最有效地通过作为独立承包商的市场治理或通过作为雇员或剩余控制权持有者（即共同所有权股份）的公司治理与人力资本资源提供者签订合同。在创业公司）。我们识别并发展了无意的逆向技能选择的概念，当企业家尝试生产未来价值不确定的新资源组合时，如果技能要求发生变化，就会发生这种情况。我们探讨了当无意的逆向技能选择突出时，公司治理的合作灵活性和市场治理的自主灵活性的比较效率。我们根据人力资本资源所拥有技能的广度和深度开发了一种类型学。我们认为，技能广度与公司治理的预期效率正相关，技能深度与市场治理的预期效率正相关。然后，我们利用这种类型学来理论化哪种治理机制对于处理四种类型的人力资本资源最有效：博学者（高技能广度，高技能深度），新手（低技能广度，低技能深度），专家（低技能）广度，高技能深度），以及万事通（高技能广度，低技能深度）。