The self or subject of experiences is often regarded as a mysterious entity, prompting approaches that seek to deflate it, metaphysically speaking. One such approach is the bundle theory, the most well-known version of which holds that each subject is a bundle of experiences. This version of the bundle theory seems vulnerable to the having objection: since subjects have experiences, they cannot be identical with bundles of experiences. I shall argue that while the having objection is intuitively plausible, its dialectical force is limited since it does not work without substantial further metaphysical assumptions.

中文翻译：

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反对经验主体的捆绑理论

从形而上学的角度来说，自我或体验主体常常被视为一个神秘的实体，从而促使人们采取一些方法来削弱它。其中一种方法是捆绑理论，其最著名的版本认为每个主题都是一组经验。这种版本的捆绑理论似乎很容易受到反对：由于主体有经验，它们不能与经验捆绑相同。我认为，虽然这种反对意见在直觉上是合理的，但其辩证力量是有限的，因为如果没有进一步的实质性形而上学假设，它就无法发挥作用。