Many firms use relative stock performance to evaluate and incentivize their CEOs. We document that such firms routinely disclose information that harms their peers' stock prices, and sometimes explicitly mention the harmed peers, by name, in these disclosures. Consistent with deliberate sabotage, peer-harming disclosures appear to be aimed at peers whose stock price depressions are most likely to benefit the disclosing firms' CEOs. The pricing effect of these disclosures does not reverse, suggesting that the disclosures contain legitimate information regarding peers' prospects. In sum, our results suggest that relative performance evaluation in CEO pay motivates CEOs to internalize the externalities of their disclosures, and strategically disclose information that harms peers' stock prices, in order to improve their firms' relative standing within their peer group.

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相对绩效评估和战略性同行伤害披露

许多公司利用相对股票表现来评估和激励其首席执行官。我们记录到，这些公司经常披露损害其同行股价的信息，有时在这些披露中明确提及受到损害的同行的名字。与蓄意破坏一致，损害同行的披露似乎是针对那些股价下跌最有可能使披露公司首席执行官受益的同行。这些披露的定价效应不会逆转，这表明这些披露包含有关同行前景的合法信息。总之，我们的研究结果表明，首席执行官薪酬的相对绩效评估会促使首席执行官将其披露的外部性内部化，并战略性地披露损害同行股价的信息，以提高公司在同行群体中的相对地位。