Institutional investors of different types have been shown to exert differential influences on firm strategic decisions individually. Yet, research has largely overlooked how institutional investors of different types can collectively affect firm decision-making. This study investigates the legal type diversity of institutional ownership (hereafter “investor type diversity”) and its influence on corporate acquisitions. Because institutional investors with different legal types have distinct interests and objectives, investor type diversity can create principal–principal conflicts and prevent institutional investors from undertaking coordinated actions, weakening their collective power and ability to play a governance role. We posit that investor type diversity will be positively associated with CEOs’ opportunistic acquisitions because the dilution of shareholder governance, resulting from investor type diversity, grants CEOs the leeway to champion acquisitions aligned more with their personal gains. We also argue that the positive influence of investor type diversity on opportunistic acquisitions will be stronger when CEOs possess a higher level of general managerial ability. However, acquisitions pursued in the presence of higher investor type diversity will be associated with poorer performance. Findings from a sample of 2,106 U.S. firms lend support to our arguments. This study advances strategy research by highlighting the importance of investor type diversity in shaping shareholder governance effectiveness.

中文翻译：

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机构投资者类型多元化与机会性收购

事实证明，不同类型的机构投资者对公司战略决策的影响不同。然而，研究在很大程度上忽视了不同类型的机构投资者如何共同影响公司决策。本研究调查了机构所有权的法律类型多样性（以下简称“投资者类型多样性”）及其对企业收购的影响。由于不同法律类型的机构投资者有着不同的利益和目标，投资者类型的多样性会产生委托人之间的冲突，妨碍机构投资者采取协调行动，削弱其集体权力和发挥治理作用的能力。我们认为，投资者类型多样性将与首席执行官的机会主义收购呈正相关，因为投资者类型多样性导致的股东治理稀释，使首席执行官有余地支持更符合个人利益的收购。我们还认为，当首席执行官拥有更高水平的综合管理能力时，投资者类型多样性对机会主义收购的积极影响会更强。然而，在投资者类型多样性较高的情况下进行的收购将导致业绩较差。对 2,106 家美国公司进行抽样调查的结果支持了我们的论点。本研究通过强调投资者类型多样性在塑造股东治理有效性方面的重要性来推进战略研究。