This paper examines the relationship between evidentialism, knowledge‐first epistemology, (E=K) in particular, and justification. Evidentialism gives an account of justified belief in terms of evidence but is silent on the nature of evidence. Knowledge‐first tells us what evidence is but stands in need of an agreed account of justification. So each might be able to supply what the other lacks. I argue that the combination of evidentialism, (E=K), and some plausible principles leads to the scepticism familiar from the Agrippan trilemma. I develop an Evidentialist Knowledge‐First view of justification that avoids scepticism by rejecting the entailment of justification by knowledge. This combination turns out to have unpalatable consequences. Nonetheless, the process of reaching that conclusion teaches lessons both to the evidentialist (regarding what evidence could be) and to the knowledge‐firster (regarding what justification is).

中文翻译：

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证据主义、正当性和知识至上

本文探讨了证据主义、知识第一认识论，特别是（E=K）与论证之间的关系。证据主义用证据来解释合理的信念，但对证据的性质却保持沉默。知识优先告诉我们什么是证据，但需要对论证达成一致的解释。因此，每个人都可以补充对方所缺乏的东西。我认为，证据主义（E=K）和一些看似合理的原则的结合导致了阿格里潘三难困境中常见的怀疑论。我发展了一种证据主义知识优先的辩护观，通过拒绝知识辩护的必然性来避免怀疑。事实证明，这种结合会产生令人不快的后果。尽管如此，得出这一结论的过程给证据主义者（关于证据可能是什么）和知识至上者（关于什么是正当性）提供了教训。