Frankfurt‐style action cases have been immensely influential in the free will and moral responsibility literatures because they arguably show that an agent can be morally responsible for a behavior despite lacking the ability to do otherwise. However, even among the philosophers who accept Frankfurt‐style action cases, there remains significant disagreement about whether also to accept Frankfurt‐style omission cases – cases in which an agent omits to do something, is unable to do otherwise, and is allegedly morally responsible for that omission. Settling this debate about Frankfurt‐style omission cases is significant because the resolution entails an important fact about moral responsibility: whether there is there a moral asymmetry between actions and omissions with respect to the ability to do otherwise. My proposal is that both Frankfurt‐style action cases and omission cases involve the same type of causal structure: causal preemption. However, the preemptor and the preemptee differ. In action cases, the Frankfurted agent preempts the neuroscientist and is causally and morally responsibility for the effect. In omission cases, Frankfurted agent is neither causally nor morally responsible for the effect. Instead, the neuroscientist preempts the Frankfurted agent. Thus, there are no Frankfurt‐style omission cases.

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为什么没有法兰克福式遗漏案例

法兰克福式的诉讼案例在自由意志和道德责任文献中具有巨大的影响力，因为它们可以证明代理人可以对某种行为承担道德责任，尽管他缺乏其他能力。然而，即使在接受法兰克福式的哲学家中行动情况下，对于是否也接受法兰克福风格仍存在重大分歧省略案件——代理人遗漏做某事，无法做其他事情，并且据称对该遗漏负有道德责任的案件。解决这场关于法兰克福式不作为案件的争论意义重大，因为该决议涉及一个关于道德责任的重要事实：作为和不作为之间是否存在相对于采取其他行动的能力的道德不对称。我的建议是，法兰克福式行动案例和不作为案例都涉及相同类型的因果结构：因果先发制人。然而，抢占者和被抢占者是不同的。在行动案例中，法兰克福特工先于神经科学家，并对结果负有因果和道德责任。在不作为的情况下，法兰克福特工对后果既不承担因果责任，也不承担道德责任。相反，神经科学家抢先了法兰克福特工。因此，不存在法兰克福式的遗漏案例。