Country participation in one-state, one-vote forums like the United Nations General Assembly often reflects underlying power asymmetries and endogenous political processes. Voting alignment is undoubtedly an important preference indicator. However, this paper contends that it is incomplete; silence is politically significant as well. Weak states use absence as a form of institutional power that shields them from geopolitical pressure and competing-principals problems. While abstention is a public signal of neutrality that undercuts voting unanimity, the ambiguous intent of absence makes it a distinct form of political expression. We examine the politics of absences at the General Assembly, highlighting how states may be strategically absent from select votes for political reasons. Building on the Bailey et al. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2), 430–456, 2017 roll-call voting data, we distinguish strategic absences from other types of absence and provide evidence that such behavior is linked to US interests and competing-principals problems. Taking these non-random reasons for missingness into account provides a fuller picture of how weak states engage with international institutions and highlights how silence can be a consequence of larger political processes.

国家对联合国大会等一国一票论坛的参与往往反映了潜在的权力不对称和内生的政治进程。投票一致性无疑是一个重要的偏好指标。然而，本文认为它是不完整的；沉默也具有政治意义。弱国利用缺席作为制度权力的一种形式，保护它们免受地缘政治压力和主体竞争问题的影响。虽然弃权是一种公开的中立信号，会削弱投票的一致性，但缺席的模糊意图使其成为一种独特的政治表达形式。我们研究了缺席大会的政治因素，强调了各国如何出于政治原因战略性地缺席选择性投票。建立在贝利等人的基础上。《冲突解决杂志》，61 (2), 430–456, 2017 年唱名投票数据，我们将战略性缺席与其他类型的缺席区分开来，并提供证据证明这种行为与美国利益和竞争主体问题相关。考虑到这些缺失的非随机原因，可以更全面地了解弱国如何参与国际机构，并强调沉默如何可能成为更大政治进程的结果。