Why would weak states accept rules which authorize strong states to take coercive action against them? I argue that, in some cases, this is a way of creating constraints over the exercise power in the form of procedural checks, or rules delineating the process through which power can legitimately be exercised. If stronger states become willing to exercise power against weak states in the absence of rules formally authorizing their behavior, this presents their actions as the new status quo. In response, weak states can attempt to re-establish constraints over the exercise of power by formally sanctioning unwanted actions, but doing so alongside procedural checks. To assess this argument, I examine the addition of a human rights suspension clause to the Lomé Convention, an aid and preferential trade agreement between the European Economic Community and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of states. The ACP states accepted a suspension clause after nearly twenty years of arguing that such a clause was paternalistic and violated the norm of non-interference. Explanations for this decision that point to one-sided dominance of IOs by the strong or straightforward support for policies on the part of the weak cannot account for important dynamics, including continued objections to the practice of suspension by ACP states and the willingness of European states to accept and utilize procedural checks.

为什么弱国会接受授权强国对其采取强制行动的规则？我认为，在某些情况下，这是以程序检查或描述合法行使权力的程序的规则的形式对权力行使施加限制的一种方式。如果强国愿意在缺乏正式授权其行为的规则的情况下对弱国行使权力，那么它们的行为就会成为新的现状。作为回应，弱国可以尝试通过正式批准不受欢迎的行为来重新建立对权力行使的限制，但同时进行程序检查。为了评估这一论点，我研究了《洛美公约》中添加的人权中止条款，该公约是欧洲经济共同体与非洲、加勒比和太平洋国家集团之间的一项援助和优惠贸易协定。非加太国家在近二十年争论该条款是家长式作风并违反不干涉原则后接受了这一条款。对这一决定的解释是，国际组织通过弱方对政策的强烈或直接支持而取得片面主导地位，但不能解释重要的动态，包括对非加太国家暂停做法的持续反对和欧洲国家的意愿接受和利用程序检查。