The bounded generalized reciprocity (BGR) model, grounded in reputation management, predicts that the motivation underlying ingroup favoritism (favoring one's own group over other groups) is driven by avoiding a negative reputation within one's own group. This research conducted two economic games with minimal groups in which reputational concerns (partners' knowledge of participants' group membership) were manipulated. We aimed to verify the replicability of the experimental results in support of the BGR model. A study ( = 394) using a dictator game (in which participants unilaterally determined their partners' payoffs) indicated the following: (1) participants were more likely to behave cooperatively with ingroup partners than with outgroup partners, regardless of whether their partners knew the participants' group membership; and (2) individual differences in fear of negative evaluation by others were not associated with cooperation toward the ingroup. Similar results were found in another study ( = 429) using a prisoner's dilemma game (in which participants' payoffs were determined by their partners). However, while sharing knowledge about group membership facilitated cooperation with the outgroup in the dictator game, no such tendency was observed in the prisoner's dilemma game. These findings suggest that concerns about a bad reputation may not play a relatively important role in ingroup favoritism, and that generosity toward outgroup members is influenced by the presence or absence of interdependence (i.e., whether the partner's behavior affects the participant's payoffs). This research proposes a reconsideration of the motivations behind cooperation within or between groups.

中文翻译：

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重新审视有界广义互惠模型：内群体偏袒和对负面评价的担忧


以声誉管理为基础的有界广义互惠 (BGR) 模型预测，群体内偏爱（偏爱自己群体而不是其他群体）背后的动机是通过避免自己群体内的负面声誉来驱动的。这项研究进行了两个最小群体的经济博弈，其中声誉问题（合作伙伴对参与者群体成员身份的了解）受到操纵。我们的目的是验证实验结果的可重复性以支持 BGR 模型。一项使用独裁者博弈（参与者单方面决定其合作伙伴的收益）的研究 (= 394) 表明：(1) 参与者更有可能与内群体合作伙伴合作，而不是与外群体合作伙伴合作，无论他们的合作伙伴是否知道参与者的团体成员资格； （2）害怕他人负面评价的个体差异与对内群体的合作无关。另一项使用囚徒困境游戏（参与者的收益由其合作伙伴决定）的研究 ( = 429) 也发现了类似的结果。然而，虽然在独裁者游戏中分享关于群体成员的知识促进了与外群体的合作，但在囚徒困境游戏中却没有观察到这种趋势。这些发现表明，对坏名声的担忧可能不会在群体偏爱中发挥相对重要的作用，而对群体外成员的慷慨则受到相互依赖是否存在的影响（即合作伙伴的行为是否影响参与者的收益）。这项研究建议重新考虑群体内部或群体之间合作背后的动机。