Can prosecutions by US authorities help spread enforcement of foreign bribery laws to other countries? In this article, we explore this question by re-examining earlier scholarship that found that US prosecutions of foreign corporations under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) increase the likelihood that the corporation's home state will enforce its own foreign bribery laws. Using a conditional-frailty Cox model that allows us to model foreign bribery enforcement actions as repeat-events, we do not find evidence that FCPA prosecutions lead to sustained increases of foreign bribery enforcement by target countries. We also find that prior results are not robust to the inclusion of an important confounding variable: a country's level of exposure to corruption in their trading partners. Still, while our findings indicate a more limited role of US law enforcement in this area, we nonetheless see many promising avenues for future research on transnational law enforcement and its consequences.

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跨国法律溢出？对经合组织反贿赂公约的重新评估

美国当局的起诉是否有助于将反海外贿赂法的执行推广到其他国家？在本文中，我们通过重新审视早期的学术研究来探讨这个问题，该学术研究发现，美国根据《反海外腐败法》(FCPA) 对外国公司进行起诉，增加了该公司所在州执行自己的海外贿赂法的可能性。使用条件脆弱 Cox 模型，我们可以将外国贿赂执法行动建模为重复事件，但我们没有发现证据表明 FCPA 起诉导致目标国家的外国贿赂执法持续增加。我们还发现，先前的结果对于包含一个重要的混杂变量（一个国家的贸易伙伴的腐败程度）并不稳健。尽管如此，尽管我们的研究结果表明美国执法部门在这一领域的作用更为有限，但我们仍然看到了未来跨国执法及其后果研究的许多有希望的途径。