Who adjusts under International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs and why? In this paper, I demonstrate that labor groups adjust when there is a fixed exchange rate regime and international financial groups are strong enough to defend the peg. In that case, the Fund substitutes currency devaluation with lowering labor costs via labor market reform. Lower wages are used to increase competitiveness and support exports. In other words, the Fund makes labor ‘cheaper’ through its labor market reform when money cannot be made ‘cheaper’ due to strong international financial interests. To test this theory, I use a mixed-method approach. I complement the case comparison of Latvia and Hungary in 2008–two very similar cases except for their exchange rate regime and the influence of international finance on their economy–with a large-N study using a global sample of IMF borrowers over the years 1989 and 2014. The paper shows that international organizations such as the IMF might amplify the voice of the strong (financial interests) while making the ‘weak’ (labor groups) weaker via their conditionality.

谁根据国际货币基金组织 (IMF) 计划进行调整？为什么？在本文中，我证明了当存在固定汇率制度并且国际金融集团足够强大以捍卫钉住汇率制时，劳工团体会进行调整。在这种情况下，国际货币基金组织通过劳动力市场改革降低劳动力成本来替代货币贬值。较低的工资被用来提高竞争力和支持出口。换句话说，当由于强大的国际金融利益而无法使货币“更便宜”时，国际货币基金组织通过劳动力市场改革使劳动力“更便宜”。为了检验这个理论，我使用了混合方法。我对 2008 年拉脱维亚和匈牙利的案例比较进行了补充——除了汇率制度和国际金融对其经济的影响之外，这两个案例非常相似——并利用 1989 年和 1989 年国际货币基金组织借款人的全球样本进行了一项大 N 研究2014年。该论文表明，国际货币基金组织等国际组织可能会放大强者（金融利益）的声音，同时通过其条件削弱“弱者”（劳工群体）的力量。