This research studies sales force incentive compensation in Brand-Managed Retail (BMR) operations, which are particularly prevalent in high-end department stores and vertically integrated retailers. In particular, the research explores how a brand’s strength may affect the relative benefit to a brand from using individual versus group incentives for motivating its salespeople in BMR settings. The authors investigate this issue using a theoretical principal-agent model consisting of a risk-neutral firm employing multiple risk-averse salespeople. Interestingly, they find that a group incentive is more beneficial to a weaker brand than to a stronger one. Furthermore, the authors find empirical support for their theoretical findings from an analysis of sales compensation data from BMR operations in two different settings. The research findings suggest that managers should factor in the brand’s strength when deciding on the optimal salesperson compensation structure in BMR settings.

中文翻译：

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EXPRESS：团体或个人销售激励？什么最适合品牌管理的零售业务？

这项研究研究了品牌管理零售 (BMR) 运营中的销售人员激励薪酬，这在高端百货商店和垂直整合零售商中尤为普遍。特别是，该研究探讨了在 BMR 环境中使用个人激励与团体激励来激励销售人员时，品牌的优势如何影响品牌的相对利益。作者使用理论委托代理模型研究了这个问题，该模型由一家风险中性公司雇用多名规避风险的销售人员组成。有趣的是，他们发现集体激励对实力较弱的品牌比对实力较强的品牌更有利。此外，作者通过对两种不同环境下 BMR 运营的销售薪酬数据的分析，找到了对其理论发现的实证支持。研究结果表明，管理者在 BMR 环境下决定最佳销售人员薪酬结构时应考虑品牌的实力。