Pareto principles are at the core of ethics and decision theory. The Strong Pareto principle says that if one thing is better than another for someone and at least as good for everyone else, then the one is overall better than the other. But a host of famous figures express it differently, with ‘not worse’ in place of ‘at least as good.’ In the presence of parity (or incommensurability), this results in a strictly stronger Pareto principle, which I call Super-Strong Pareto. Super-Strong Pareto, however, yields cyclic betterness and is therefore false. I point out a number of influential arguments—concerning population ethics, collective action problems, and decision-making in the face of parity and uncertainty—that crucially rely on Super-Strong Pareto and are therefore unsound. I then turn to the most influential argument against the possibility of parity—Broome's collapsing argument—and argue that it likewise relies on Super-Strong Pareto reasoning and is therefore question-begging. Finally, I turn to the much-neglected question of how to justify Strong Pareto. The answer I arrive at, which emphasizes tie-breaking, yields a striking insight, namely that Super-Strong Pareto amounts to the denial of insensitivity to mild sweetening. That is what makes it problematic in the presence of parity.

中文翻译：

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平价和帕累托

帕累托原则是伦理学和决策理论的核心。强帕累托原则说，如果一件事对某人来说比另一件事更好，并且至少对其他人来说同样好，那么这一件事总体上比另一件事更好。但许多著名人物的表达方式不同，他们用“不更差”代替“至少一样好”。在存在奇偶性（或不可通约性）的情况下，这会产生严格更强的帕累托原理，我称之为超强帕累托原理。然而，超强帕累托产生循环最优，因此是错误的。我指出了一些有影响力的论点——涉及人口伦理、集体行动问题以及面对平等和不确定性时的决策——这些论点主要依赖于超强帕累托，因此是不合理的。然后，我转向反对平价可能性的最有影响力的论点——布鲁姆的崩溃论点——并认为它同样依赖于超强帕累托推理，因此是回避问题的。最后，我转向一个经常被忽视的问题：如何证明强帕累托的合理性。我得出的答案强调打破平局，产生了一个惊人的见解，即超强帕累托等于否认对温和甜味剂不敏感。这就是奇偶校验存在时出现问题的原因。