The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is decentralized, wherein field offices coordinated at the state level undertake inspections. We study whether this structure can lead to interstate frictions in sharing information and how this impacts firms’ compliance with workplace safety laws. We find that firms caught violating in one state subsequently violate less in that state but violate more in other states. Despite this pattern, and in keeping with information frictions, violations in one state do not trigger proactive OSHA inspections in other states. Moreover, firms face lower monetary penalties when subsequent violations occur across state lines, likely due to the lack of documentation necessary to assess severe penalties. Finally, firms are more likely to shift violating behavior into states with greater information frictions. Our findings suggest that internal information within regulators impacts the likelihood and location of corporate misconduct.

中文翻译：

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监管机构内部信息摩擦的影响：工作场所安全违规行为的证据

职业安全与健康管理局（OSHA）是权力下放的，由州一级协调的现场办事处负责检查。我们研究这种结构是否会导致州际信息共享方面的摩擦，以及这如何影响公司遵守工作场所安全法。我们发现，在一个州被发现违法的公司随后在该州的违法行为较少，但在其他州的违法行为较多。尽管存在这种模式，并且与信息摩擦保持一致，一个州的违规行为不会触发其他州的主动 OSHA 检查。此外，当随后跨州发生违规行为时，公司面临的罚款会较低，这可能是由于缺乏评估严厉处罚所需的文件。最后，企业更有可能将违规行为转移到信息摩擦更大的国家。我们的研究结果表明，监管机构内部信息会影响企业不当行为的可能性和地点。