Deflationists about truth hold that the function of the truth predicate is to enable us to make certain assertions we could not otherwise make. Pragmatists claim that the utility of negation lies in its role in registering incompatibility. The pragmatist insight about negation has been successfully incorporated into bilateral theories of content, which take the meaning of negation to be inferentially explained in terms of the speech act of rejection. We implement the deflationist insight in a bilateral theory by taking the meaning of the truth predicate to be explained by its inferential relation to assertion. We combine this account of the meaning of the truth predicate with a new diagnosis of the liar paradox: its derivation requires the truth rules to preserve evidence, but these rules only preserve commitment. The result is a novel inferential deflationist theory of truth, which solves the liar paradox in a principled manner. We end by showing that our theory and simple extensions thereof have the resources to axiomatize the internal logic of several supervaluational hierarchies, including Cantini’s. This solves open problems of Halbach (2011) and Horsten (2011).

中文翻译：

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推论紧缩论

关于真值的紧缩论者认为，真值谓词的功能是使我们能够做出某些我们原本无法做出的断言。实用主义者声称否定的效用在于它在记录不相容性方面的作用。关于否定的实用主义见解已成功地融入双边内容理论中，该理论通过拒绝的言语行为来推论地解释否定的含义。我们通过将真谓词的含义通过其与断言的推论关系来解释，在双边理论中实现紧缩论的见解。我们将这种对真值谓词意义的解释与对说谎者悖论的新诊断结合起来：它的推导需要真值规则来保存证据，但这些规则只保留承诺。其结果是一种新颖的推论紧缩真理理论，它以原则性的方式解决了说谎者悖论。最后，我们表明，我们的理论及其简单扩展具有使包括坎蒂尼在内的几个超评价层次结构的内部逻辑公理化的资源。这解决了 Halbach (2011) 和 Horsten (2011) 的开放问题。