Researchers are divided on whether shareholder agreements (SAs) improve or hurt firm value. We offer family firms as a context where SAs add value and explain why; SAs limit “superprincipal” agency conflicts between family owners and other family members. A panel of French firms and a second study of French Initial Public Offerings show shareholders value SAs more in family than in nonfamily firms. Among family firms, SAs add greater value when weak governance undermines family owners’ resistance to other family members’ demands. Our study helps reconcile competing theory about SAs and distinguishes superprincipal conflicts from other family-firm agency problems.

中文翻译：

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股东协议何时会增加价值？缓解家族企业中的超级代理冲突

对于股东协议（SA）是否会提高还是损害公司价值，研究人员存在分歧。我们为家族企业提供 SA 增值的环境，并解释原因； SA 限制了家族所有者和其他家族成员之间的“超级主要”代理冲突。法国公司小组和法国首次公开募股的第二项研究表明，与非家族企业相比，股东更看重家族企业中的股份公司。在家族企业中，当治理薄弱削弱家族所有者对其他家族成员要求的抵制时，SA 会增加更大的价值。我们的研究有助于协调有关 SA 的竞争理论，并将超级主体冲突与其他家族企业代理问题区分开来。