When people accidentally harm others, some theory anticipates that expressing normatively unexpected (“false positive”) guilt is socially functional because it signals a positive moral character and likability. Although previous evidence shows anticipated effects of false positive guilt on these outcomes, it is possible these effects result from perceiving aspects specific to empathy (vs. guilt). We address this possibility in three preregistered studies. Participants answered questions regarding their perceptions of agents of accidental harm. In Experiment 1 ( = 299), agents that expressed guilt (vs. no guilt) received higher moral character and likability ratings; mediation evidence suggested these effects resulted via perceptions that the agent experienced empathy-specific (e.g., concern, understanding), not guilt-specific (e.g., self-blame) sentiments; if anything, guilt-specific sentiments reduced some moral character evaluations. Experiment 2 ( = 503) was a conceptual replication with more ecologically valid methods; it provided similar conclusions. Experiment 3 ( = 653) crossed an agent's expression of guilt-specific sentiments (present vs. absent) with empathy-specific sentiments (present vs. absent). Main effects of empathy-specific sentiments on moral character and likability judgments were at least seven times larger than those attributed to guilt-specific sentiments. Additionally, when empathy-specific sentiments were expressed, the expression of guilt-specific sentiments had no positive effects on moral character and likability judgments; however, when empathy-specific sentiments were expressed, the expression of guilt-specific sentiments enhanced some but not all moral character judgments. We discuss how our findings contribute to understanding the social benefits of expressing false positive guilt and cohere with some impression formation perspectives.

中文翻译：

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判断无罪者的有罪：“假阳性”内疚和同理心在道德品质感知中的作用


当人们不小心伤害他人时，一些理论预计，表达规范性的意外（“假阳性”）内疚感具有社会功能，因为它标志着积极的道德品质和讨人喜欢的信号。尽管之前的证据显示假阳性内疚对这些结果的预期影响，但这些影响可能是由于对同理心（与内疚）特有的感知造成的。我们在三项预先注册的研究中探讨了这种可能性。参与者回答了有关他们对意外伤害因素的看法的问题。在实验 1 ( = 299) 中，表现出内疚感（与无内疚感相比）的代理人获得了更高的道德品质和可爱度评分；调解证据表明，这些影响是由于认为代理人经历了特定于同理心（例如，关心、理解）而不是特定于内疚（例如，自责）的情绪而产生的；如果说有什么不同的话，那就是特定于内疚的情绪降低了一些道德品质的评价。实验 2 ( = 503) 是一个概念复制，采用了更生态有效的方法；它也得出了类似的结论。实验 3 (= 653) 将代理人表达的特定内疚情绪（存在与不存在）与同理心特定情绪（存在与不存在）进行交叉。共情特定情绪对道德品质和可爱性判断的主要影响至少比内疚特定情绪大七倍。此外，当表达共情特定情绪时，表达内疚特定情绪对道德品质和可爱度判断没有积极影响；然而，当表达特定于同理心的情感时，表达特定于内疚的情感会增强一些但不是全部的道德品质判断。 我们讨论了我们的发现如何有助于理解表达假阳性内疚的社会效益，并与一些印象形成的观点相一致。