When countries are confronted with a crisis and have no alternative but to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), speed is of the essence. Why do some countries negotiate IMF loans more quickly than others? We introduce an original dataset on the timing and intensity of negotiations between the borrowing government and IMF staff for more than 700 IMF loans agreed between 1985 and 2020. Applying concepts from this special issue on the “Power of the Weak” (Snidal et al., 2024), we argue that although borrowing countries are in a weak position when they approach the IMF, they nonetheless sometimes achieve more rapid negotiations. In particular, we argue that borrowers can obtain speedier negotiations on the basis of their ties to major IMF shareholder states, specifically through shared membership in other international organizations and financial exposure. Importantly, we suggest that well-placed borrowers can hasten the conclusion of negotiations without compromising on the conditions attached to IMF programs. We use our original data and an illustrative case study of Côte d’Ivoire to support our claims.

当各国面临危机而别无选择，只能求助于国际货币基金组织（IMF）时，速度至关重要。为什么有些国家比其他国家更快地谈判国际货币基金组织贷款？我们引入了关于借款国政府与国际货币基金组织工作人员之间就 1985 年至 2020 年间商定的 700 多笔国际货币基金组织贷款进行谈判的时间和强度的原始数据集。 ，2024），我们认为，尽管借款国在与国际货币基金组织接触时处于弱势地位，但它们有时仍能实现更快的谈判。我们特别认为，借款人可以基于与国际货币基金组织主要股东国的关系，特别是通过在其他国际组织中的共同成员资格和金融风险，获得更快的谈判。重要的是，我们建议，条件优越的借款人可以在不损害国际货币基金组织计划附加条件的情况下加快谈判的完成。我们使用原始数据和科特迪瓦的说明性案例研究来支持我们的主张。