The article provides an argument that the platform is the site of Burawoy’s workplace games. The game observed on the platform used a pattern quite similar to one diagnosed by Burawoy, successfully employing coercion and consent to control the workforce. Control on the platform has a general nature which combines technological, organisational and normative aspects. Work on the app is coordinated by adopting a co-optation strategy, reducing conflicts by enabling mobility, and remuneration from the platform is based on a piece-rate system. Yet, the modern game, labelled in the paper as Ride-Pass, is different from the one described by Burawoy. Due the game is taking place in the service sector, the article argues that it is structured around two mutually connected stakes: working time and self-recognition. The article contributes to the Labour Process Theory, supporting its conclusions with a long-lasting study among Polish platform workers (53 interviews with Uber’s drivers).

中文翻译：

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平台工作中的Ride-Pass游戏：将Burawoy的工作场所游戏概念应用于波兰以应用程序为媒介的打车行业

文章提供了一个论点，该平台是Burawoy公司的职场游戏网站。在该平台上观察到的游戏使用了与布洛维诊断的模式非常相似的模式，成功地利用强制和同意来控制劳动力。对平台的控制具有一般性，结合了技术、组织和规范方面。该应用程序的工作通过采用增选策略进行协调，通过实现流动性来减少冲突，平台的报酬基于计件工资制度。然而，论文中标记为“Ride-Pass”的现代游戏与布洛维描述的游戏不同。由于游戏发生在服务行业，文章认为，它是围绕两个相互关联的利害关系构建的：工作时间和自我认可。这篇文章对劳动过程理论做出了贡献，通过对波兰平台工人的长期研究（对 Uber 司机的 53 次采访）来支持其结论。