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Equity Incentive Plans and Board of Director Discretion over Equity Grants
Journal of Accounting Research ( IF 4.9 ) Pub Date : 2024-03-12 , DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12532
BRIAN CADMAN 1 , RICHARD CARRIZOSA 2
Affiliation  

Equity compensation is granted out of an equity incentive plan that must be approved by shareholders and cedes discretion over equity grants to boards of directors. We predict and find that equity plan proposals give boards more discretion over grants when the firm faces greater labor market forces and more volatile stock returns. When examining votes, we find that shareholders are less likely to support plans with abnormal discretion. We also find that boards with more discretion grant more equity in response to stock price declines. Lastly, we find that boards request additional shares when their ability to grant equity is more constrained by a smaller pool of available shares, and when they plan to increase equity grants. Overall our findings illuminate how firms balance needs to respond to labor market pressure and volatile operating environments against shareholder governance and oversight of equity compensation.

中文翻译:


股权激励计划及董事会对股权授予的酌情决定权



股权补偿是通过股权激励计划授予的,该计划必须经股东批准,并将股权授予的酌处权交给董事会。我们预测并发现,当公司面临更大的劳动力市场力量和更不稳定的股票回报时,股权计划提案赋予董事会在拨款方面更大的自由裁量权。在审查投票时,我们发现股东不太可能支持具有异常自由裁量权的计划。我们还发现,拥有更多自由裁量权的董事会会授予更多股权,以应对股价下跌。最后,我们发现,当董事会授予股权的能力受到较小的可用股票池的更大限制时,以及当他们计划增加股权授予时,董事会会要求额外的股票。总体而言,我们的研究结果阐明了企业如何在应对劳动力市场压力和不稳定的运营环境的需求与股东治理和股权薪酬监督之间取得平衡。
更新日期:2024-03-12
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