Classic models of urban inequality acknowledge the importance of politics for resource distribution and service provision. Yet, contemporary studies of spatial inequality rarely measure politics directly. In this paper, we introduce political dynasties as a way of integrating political economy approaches with ecological theory to better understand the political construction of urban spatial inequality. To do so, we examine the case of political dynasties within the Chicago city council. We show that, from 2011 to 2018, blocks in dynastic wards saw fewer homicides, assaults, robberies, and thefts relative to those in non-dynastic wards. We then leverage the 2015 ward redistricting to provide evidence that dynastic effects play some role in producing these outcomes: blocks annexed into dynastic wards experienced a decline in assaults and robberies and an increase in pothole coverings. While dynastic politicians improve outcomes for blocks they annex, they also withdraw power from those they displace; and displaced blocks had relatively higher levels of crime than annexed blocks in 2015. Taken together, our findings provide evidence that dynastic politicians are contributing to spatial inequalities within Chicago.

中文翻译：

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政治王朝如何在城市内集中优势：来自芝加哥犯罪和城市服务的证据

城市不平等的经典模型承认政治对于资源分配和服务提供的重要性。然而，当代对空间不平等的研究很少直接衡量政治。在本文中，我们引入政治王朝作为政治经济学方法与生态理论相结合的一种方式，以更好地理解城市空间不平等的政治建构。为此，我们研究了芝加哥市议会内部政治王朝的案例。我们发现，从 2011 年到 2018 年，与非王朝区相比，王朝区的街区发生的凶杀、袭击、抢劫和盗窃事件较少。然后，我们利用 2015 年选区重新划分来提供证据，证明王朝效应在产生这些结果中发挥了一定作用：并入王朝选区的街区经历了袭击和抢劫的减少以及坑洼覆盖物的增加。虽然王朝政治家改善了他们吞并的地区的结果，但他们也从他们取代的地区撤回了权力。2015 年，流离失所的街区的犯罪率相对较高。总而言之，我们的研究结果提供了证据，表明王朝政客正在加剧芝加哥内部的空间不平等。