I argue that beliefs based on irresponsibly formed experiences—whose causes were not appropriately regulated by the subject—are doxastically unjustified. Only this position, I claim, accounts for the higher epistemic standard required of perceptual experts. Section I defends this standard and applies it to a pair of cases in which either an expert umpire or a complete novice judge a force play in baseball. I argue that when the latter, but not the former, fails to follow rules about perceiving force plays, their resulting belief is justified. Section II shows that this difference can be explained by the fact that the novice, but not the expert, formed her experience responsibly. Section III shows that alternative explanations of the expert’s unjustified belief—from defeat, reliability, and inference—fail. Section IV shows that the epistemic relevance of responsible experience formation has broad implications for the epistemology of perceptual beliefs.

中文翻译：

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责任与感悟

我认为，基于不负责任形成的经验的信念——其原因没有受到主体的适当调节——是不合理的。我认为，只有这个立场才能解释感知专家所要求的更高的认知标准。第一节捍卫了这一标准，并将其应用于两个案例，在这两个案例中，专家裁判员或完全新手判断棒球比赛中的强力比赛。我认为，当后者（而不是前者）未能遵循感知力发挥的规则时，他们由此产生的信念是合理的。第二节表明，这种差异可以通过以下事实来解释：新手（而不是专家）负责任地形成了她的经验。第三节表明，对专家不合理信念的其他解释（来自失败、可靠性和推论）是失败的。第四节表明，负责任的经验形成的认知相关性对知觉信念的认识论具有广泛的影响。