Ridesharing platforms compensate drivers using a fixed commission system that does not systematically reward effective drivers, which reduces platform engagement. Unsurprisingly, driver transaction activity is intermittent and service unpredictable. Influenced by agency theory, we propose a variable commission that jointly accounts for drivers’ transactions and service performance. To alleviate disengagement, we propose a customer-oriented engagement framework that challenges the notion of the sole monetary focus of drivers. We compare the effects of variable and fixed commission schemes on consequences such as driver net revenue and referral value, mediated by attitudinal outcomes. In a 3-month cluster-randomized field experiment with 3,367 ridesharing drivers across 16 cities and two population tiers, we show improvements in driver satisfaction and emotional connectedness accentuated by goal-oriented feedback. Variable commission with goal-oriented feedback translates to a 24.5% rise in revenue, a 19.5% increase in referral value, and a 43.21% lower churn. A cost–benefit analysis reinforces these results.

乘车共享平台使用固定佣金制度对司机进行补偿，该制度不会系统地奖励有效的司机，从而降低了平台参与度。毫不奇怪，司机交易活动是间歇性的并且服务不可预测。受代理理论的影响，我们提出了可变佣金，共同考虑司机的交易和服务绩效。为了缓解脱离问题，我们提出了一个以客户为导向的参与框架，挑战了司机只关注金钱的概念。我们比较了可变佣金计划和固定佣金计划对司机净收入和推荐价值等后果的影响，这些后果是由态度结果介导的。在对 16 个城市和两个人口层级的 3,367 名拼车司机进行的为期 3 个月的整群随机实地实验中，我们发现，以目标为导向的反馈增强了司机满意度和情感联系的改善。具有目标导向反馈的可变佣金意味着收入增加 24.5%，推荐价值增加 19.5%，客户流失率降低 43.21%。成本效益分析强化了这些结果。