Forward-looking information, often used by auditors to evaluate complex estimates and form conclusions about going-concern audit report modifications, is commonly disclosed voluntarily by U.S. public companies. We experimentally examine how this disclosure behavior affects auditors’ skepticism toward such information. Prior research has shown that investors and analysts frequently interpret voluntarily disclosed forward-looking information as credible. We demonstrate that auditors, in contrast, exhibit greater skepticism toward forecasted information that has been voluntarily disclosed (vs. mandatorily disclosed or held privately) because of their reduced trust in management, even when the forecasts align with prior year trends (vs. being more optimistic). Our results suggest that a manager's decision to disclose, rather than the disclosure content itself, leads to increased auditor skepticism. Our findings have implications not only for audit outcomes, but also for manager disclosure behavior, as increased auditor scrutiny could discourage future voluntary disclosure.

中文翻译：

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管理层自愿披露行为如何影响审计师的判断？

前瞻性信息通常被审计师用来评估复杂的估计并形成有关持续经营审计报告修改的结论，这些信息通常由美国上市公司自愿披露。我们通过实验研究了这种披露行为如何影响审计师对此类信息的怀疑。先前的研究表明，投资者和分析师经常将自愿披露的前瞻性信息视为可信的。我们证明，相比之下，审计师对自愿披露（相对于强制披露或私下持有）的预测信息表现出更大的怀疑，因为他们对管理层的信任度降低，即使预测与上一年的趋势一致（相对于更乐观的）。我们的结果表明，导致审计师怀疑增加的是经理的披露决定，而不是披露内容本身。我们的研究结果不仅对审计结果有影响，而且对经理的披露行为也有影响，因为加强审计师审查可能会阻碍未来的自愿披露。